WHITE, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BLACKMUN and STEVENS, JJ., joined, post, p. 658. See ante, at 642, 649, 652, 657-658. In some exceptional cases, a reapportionment plan may be so highly irregular that, on its face, it rationally cannot be. What was argued? (emphasis added). Race in redistricting is permissible as long as configurations are not too extreme, ch 7 part 2 prep pronouns and demonstratives, Christina Dejong, Christopher E. Smith, George F Cole, Government in America: Elections and Updates Edition, George C. Edwards III, Martin P. Wattenberg, Robert L. Lineberry. Under 5, the State remained free to seek a declaratory judgment from the District Court for the District of Columbia notwithstanding the Attorney General's objection. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U. S. 725, 755 (1983) (STEVENS, J., concurring) ("One need not use Justice Stewart's classic definition of obscenity-'I know it when I see it' -as an ultimate standard for judging the constitutionality of a gerrymander to recognize that dramatically irregular shapes may have sufficient probative force to call for an explanation" (footnotes omitted)). The Court applied the same reasoning to the "uncouth twenty-eight-sided" municipal boundary line at issue in Gomillion. They also point out that in 1990 a black candidate defeated a white opponent in the Democratic Party runoff for a United States Senate seat before being defeated narrowly by the Republican incumbent in the general election. 5 See Richmond v. J. See ante, at 652 (acknowledging that "UJO set forth a standard under which white voters can establish unconstitutional vote dilution"). Laws that explicitly distinguish between individuals on racial grounds fall within the core of that prohibition. Ruth O. Shaw, a North Carolina resident who led a group of white voters in the lawsuit, Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas. The North Carolina Republican Party and individual voters brought suit in Federal District Court, alleging that the plan constituted an unconstitutional political gerrymander under Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U. S. 109 (1986). It is unnecessary for us to decide whether or how a reapportionment plan that, on its face, can be explained in nonracial terms successfully could be challenged. (1) The Common Cause District Court concluded that all but one of the districts in North Carolina's 2016 Plan violated the Equal Protection Clause by intentionally diluting the voting strength of Demo crats. whether appellants' complaint stated a claim under constitutional provisions other than the Fourteenth Amendment. Our voting rights precedents support that conclusion. Clause" (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U. S. 614, 630-631 (1991) ("If our society is to continue to progress as a multiracial democracy, it must recognize that the automatic invocation of race stereotypes retards that progress and causes continued hurt and injury"). Shaw v. Reno Jennifer Denise Rogers . JUSTICE SOUTER contends that exacting scrutiny of racial gerrymanders under the Fourteenth Amendment is inappropriate because reapportionment "nearly always require[s] some consideration of race for legitimate reasons." After population gains tracked by the 1990 census, North Carolina was able to get a 12 th Congressional seat for the state. The facts of this case mirror those presented in United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U. S. 144 (1977) (UJO), where the Court rejected a claim that creation of a majority-minority district violated the Constitution, either as a per se matter or in light of the circumstances leading to the creation of such a district. Because the General Assembly's reapportionment plan affected the covered counties, the parties agree that 5 applied. We summarily affirmed that decision. The other part of the majority's explanation of its holding is related to its simultaneous discomfort and fascination with irregularly shaped districts. US attorney general rejected a North Carolina congressional reappointment plan because the plan created only one black majority district, 1. Racial gerrymandering, even for remedial purposes, may balkanize us into competing racial factions; it threatens to carry us further from the goal of a political system in which race no longer matters--a goal that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments embody, and to which the Nation continues to aspire. We express no view as to whether appellants successfully could have challenged such a district under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Reynolds, 377 U. S., at 578 (recognizing these as legitimate state interests). The Court extended the reasoning of Gomillion to congressional districting in Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U. S. 52 (1964). As for representative democracy, I have difficulty seeing how it is threatened (indeed why it is not, rather, enhanced) by districts that are not even alleged to dilute anyone's vote. 9 As has been remarked, "[d]ragons, bacon strips, dumbbells and other strained shapes are not always reliable signs that partisan (or racial or ethnic or factional) interests are being served, while the most regularly drawn district may turn out to have been skillfully constructed with an intent to aid one party." See, e. g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339,341. Bandemer, 478 U. S., at 164 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal quotation marks omitted). If the company issues these new bonds at an annual coupon rate of 8%, they will sell at par. It is unnecessary for us to decide whether or how a reapportionment plan that, on its face, can be explained in nonracial terms successfully could be challenged. See UJO, 430 U. S., at 165-166 (plurality opinion of WHITE, J., joined by STEVENS and REHNQUIST, JJ. ), or that such had been the State's intent, see id., at 179-180 (Stewart, J., joined by Powell, J., concurring in judgment). Supp., at 472-473. No. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act forbids districting plans that will have a discriminatory effect on minority groups. The Court appears to accept this, and it does not purport to disturb the law of vote dilution in any way. Supreme Court rulings in the Shaw v. Reno (1995) and the Shelby County vs. Holder (2013) cases relied heavily on the reasoning behind the passage of the Voting Rights Act (1965). As we have said, however, the very reason that the Equal Protection Clause demands strict scrutiny of all racial classifications is because without it, a court cannot determine whether or not the discrimination truly is "benign." Appellants alleged not that the revised plan constituted a political gerrymander, nor that it violated the "one person, one vote" principle, see Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 558 (1964), but that the State had created an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. Robinson O. Everett argued the cause for appellants. It is also unnecessary to decide at this stage of the litigation whether the plan advances a state interest distinct from the Act: eradicating the effects of past racial discrimination. Appellants, five North Carolina residents, filed this action against appellee state and federal officials, claiming that the State had created an unconstitutional racial gerrymander in violation of, among other things, the Fourteenth Amendment. SHAW ET AL. Although I disagree with the holding that appellants' claim is cognizable, the Court's discussion of the level of scrutiny it requires warrants a few comments. The Court expresses no view on whether appellants successfully could have challenged a district such as that suggested by the Attorney General or whether their complaint stated a claim under other constitutional provisions. There are three financing options: 1. The State has made no mystery of its intent, which was to respond to the Attorney General's objections, see Brief for State Appellees 13-14, by improving the minority group's prospects of electing a candidate of its choice. Pope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp. 7, that included a second majority-black district. 42 U. S. C. 1973c; see also 1973b(f)(2). Cf. Nevertheless, there was no fencing out of the white population from participation in the political processes of the county, and the. See, e. g., Holland v. Illinois, 493 U. S. 474, 484, n. 2 (1990) ("[A] prosecutor's assumption that a black juror may be presumed to be partial simply because he is black violates the Equal Protection. Journalize the entry to record the identification of the customers bad debt. No analogous purpose or effect has been alleged in this case. They reinforce the belief, held by too many for too much of our history, that individuals should be judged by the color of their skin. where t(0t24)t(0 \leq t \leq 24)t(0t24) is the number of hours past midnight. Instead, the Court creates a new "analytically distinct," ibid., cause of action, the principal element of which is that a districting plan be "so bizarre on its face," ante, at 644, or "irrational on its face," ante, at 652, or "extremely irregular on its face," ante, at 642, that it "rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to segregate citizens into separate voting districts on the basis of race without sufficient justification," ante, at 652. The Act proved immediately successful in ensuring racial minorities access to the voting booth; by the early 1970's, the spread between black and white registration in several of the targeted Southern States had fallen to well below 10%. Today, the Court recognizes a new cause of action under which a State's electoral redistricting plan that includes a configuration "so bizarre," ante, at 644, that it "rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to separate voters into different districts on the basis of race [without] sufficient justification," ante, at 649, will be subjected to strict scrutiny. Laws, ch. 808 F. Supp. Id., at 357 (internal quotation marks omitted). It is shortsighted as well, for a regularly shaped district can just as effectively effectuate racially discriminatory gerrymandering as an odd-shaped one.9 By focusing on looks rather than impact, the majority "immediately casts attention in the wrong direction-toward superficialities of shape and size, rather than toward the political realities of district composition." of Ed., supra, at 282-283 (plurality opinion). We also do not decide. The Court reasoned: "If these allegations upon a trial remained uncontradicted or unqualified, the conclusion would be irresistible, tantamount for all practical purposes to a mathematical demonstration, that the legislation is solely concerned with segregating white and colored voters by fencing Negro citizens out of town so as to deprive them of their pre-existing municipal vote." tutes an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. 1300 (1966). Today, the Court recognizes a new cause of action under which a State's electoral redistricting plan that includes a configuration "so bizarre" that it "rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to separate voters into different districts on the basis of race [without] sufficient justification" will be subjected to strict scrutiny. After the Attorney General of the United States objected to the plan pursuant to 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. Congress, too, responded to the problem of vote dilution. [Appendix containing map of North Carolina Congressional Plan follows this page.]. Thus, "an equal protection violation may be found only where the electoral system substantially disadvantages certain voters in their opportunity to influence the political process effectively." On the same reasoning, I would affirm the District Court's dismissal of appellants' claim in this instance. Not very long ago, of course, it was argued that minority groups defined by race were the only groups the Equal Protection Clause protected in this context. So, too, would be a case in which a State concentrated a dispersed minority population in a single district by disregarding traditional districting principles such as compactness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions. It is for these reasons that race-based districting by our state legislatures demands close judicial scrutiny. William H. Rehnquist Rehnquist. That it may be difficult to determine from the face of a single-member districting plan that it makes such a distinction does not mean that a racial gerrymander, once established, should receive less scrutiny than other legislation classifying citizens by race. by Herbert Wachtell, William H. Brown III, Thomas J. Henderson, Frank R. Parker, Brenda Wright, Nicholas DeB. Subsequent decisions of this Court have similarly interpreted Gomillion as turning on the unconstitutional effect of the legislation. Action verbs tell what the subject is doing or what is being done to the subject. Justia makes no guarantees or warranties that the annotations are accurate or reflect the current state of law, and no annotation is intended to be, nor should it be construed as, legal advice. See, e. g., Croson, 488 U. S., at 491-493 (opinion of O'CONNOR, J., joined by REHNQUIST, C. J., and WHITE, J. Cf. Nor was it ever in doubt that "the State deliberately used race in a purposeful manner." Limited by its own terms to cases involving unusually shaped districts, the Court's approach nonetheless will unnecessarily hinder to some extent a State's voluntary effort to ensure a modicum of minority representation. What is being done to the `` uncouth twenty-eight-sided '' municipal boundary line at in! 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